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Introduction 
The filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 
by the LTV Corporation on  July 17,1986 focused 
renewed attention on the recent evolution of 
corporate  reorganizations under the Bankruptcy 
Code. This article reviews that evolution and 
offers alternative explanations for the kinds of 
uses noted in recent Chapter 11 petitions. To 
some observers, a Chapter 11 petition is becom- 
ing one of the standard financial strategies of 
large corporations. In a period of disinflation, the 
filing of a Chapter 11 petition is not a completely 
unexpected or unnatural response to the need to 
reduce corporate obligations. 
Alternative legal mechanisms do 
exist for the orderly downsizing of corporate 
assets and liabilities in the face of a generally fal- 
ling price level or a significantly reduced demand 
in specific markets. Those alternatives include 
assignments for the benefit of creditors, corporate 
liquidations, and corporate dissolutions and reor- 
ganizations under state law, as well as contractual 
agreements for nonbankruptcy lending ("work- 
outs"). However, those alternatives often are 
unsatisfactory because they do  not provide a con- 
venient method for debtors to stay all creditors' 
claims automatically or to reject burdensome 
contingent liabilities. Thus, corporate reorganiza- 
tion under Chapter 11 typically is the debtor's 
preferred alternative. Creditors also may prefer 
the orderly process of negotiation with a debtor 
through creditors' committees under the supervi- 
sion of a federal bankruptcy court, instead of 
attempts to reorganize the debtor without the 
court's protection and assistance. 
A more restrained, and probably 
more accurate, view of bankruptcy petitions such 
as that filed by LTV is that a Chapter 11 filing may 
be helpful in restructuring large claims of secured 
creditors and of creditors with the priority claims 
described in section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code 
(11 U.S.C. section 507). Nevertheless, the use of 
Chapter 11 filings as a sword rather than a shield 
was not traditionally contemplated under the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code or the prior United States 
bankruptcy acts. 
I.  An Economic Perspective 
Basic economics textbooks pay little, if  any, atten- 
tion to bankruptcy proceedings as a mechanism 
for allocating resources. When an uncompetitive 
firm becomes insolvent, economics texts gener- 
ally assume that its assets will be liquidated to 
satisfy creditors and that the firm no longer will 
exist. Economists call this process "exit from the 
market." Shareholders may suffer large losses, 
including the complete loss of their investments. 
At times, new investors purchase some of the liqui- 
dated assets on favorable terms, putting up fresh 
capital, and a new firm "enters the market." Some 
former assets are scrapped, some former employ- 
ees are not re-employed, and some former credi- 
tors are not paid fully. The new firm generally has 
a better chance of succeeding than the old firm be- 
cause it has some combination of lower costs, 
greater productivity, and better management. 
Economists describe this market-driven process 
as being efficient because investors purchase 
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assets or new stock in the firm at market prices. 
Those investors could have used their capital for 
other purposes. 
In practice, corporate reorganiza- 
tions under the Bankruptcy Code allocate re- 
sources in a manner that may differ significantly 
fiom an economist's description of corporate 
reorganizations.  Under Chapter 11, troubled firms 
essentially bargain with creditors' committees 
and, occasionally, with their own employees 
regarding the conditions under which they can 
remain "going concerns." Negotiations with 
employees typically would cover the restructuring 
of executives' compensation contracts and 
unions' collective bargaining agreements. 
The bankruptcy judge acts as a 
mediator/arbitrator, following the Bankrupcty 
Rules. However, the real power to affect the day- 
to-day operations of a debtor is in the hands of 
the creditors' committees. Usually, management 
of the bankrupt firm attempts to remain in con- 
trol of the ongoing operations of the enterprise. 
In such cases, management is referred to as the 
"debtor in possession." Often, as was the case 
with the LIV  filing, bank creditors already have a 
functioning committee that has been negotiating 
with management before a bankruptcy petition is 
filed. Thus, it is not at all inaccurate to describe 
the bankruptcy judge as a detached mediator or 
referee. Usually, the judge plays only a small role 
in preparing a reorganization plan. That plan 
ordinarily is drafted by the debtor and must be 
ratified by the creditors' committees. The com- 
mittees may serve as active, involved co-managers 
of the bankrupt firm, and it is not unusual for 
counsel for the creditors' committees to meet at 
least weekly with management. 
If no  agreement between the bank- 
rupt firm and its creditors can be reached volun- 
tarily, the court, usually acting through a trustee, 
can impose a solution. One possible solution is a 
complete liquidation of the firm, but such a solu- 
tion is used in Chapter 11 cases only after a judge 
determines that no viable alternative exists. It 
would be mere coincidence if a firm reorganized 
in a Chapter 11. proceeding had the same assets, 
liabilities, capitalization, labor force, wage rates, 
and productivity as a market-organized firm. 
Indeed, a Chapter 11 proceeding may support, at 
least temporarily, the continued existence of a 
firm that otherwise would have been liquidated. 
Corporate reorganization arguably 
is always a smoother process for all concerned 
rather than a straight liquidation under Chapter 7 
of the Bankruptcy Code. That is why the threat of 
filing a Chapter 7 petition serves management as 
a strong bargaining tactic in dealing with credi- 
tors' committees. Regardless of the outcome of a 
Chapter 11 proceeding, all parties theoretically 
have a sense of participation and partial control 
in a corporate reorganization. If reorganization 
produces a new firm that proves to be uncompet- 
itive, and if  further restructuring is required, at 
least the affected parties will have time to adjust 
to the changed circumstances. 
Yet, to the extent that a Chapter 11 
petition thwarts the discipline of the market- 
place, the ultimate costs of corporate reorganiza- 
tion to society may be greater than those of cor- 
porate liquidation. This can occur because the 
court's judgment as to the viability of the reorgan- 
ized firm and any arrangement reflecting the 
vested interests of the creditors may be wrong. 
On the other hand, lawyers seem to believe that 
creditors' lawyers, bankruptcy judges, and trustees 
usually assess the possibilities of corporate reor- 
ganizations accurately because of their repeated 
experiences with working out the consequences 
of Chapter 11 petitions. Also, the continued pres- 
ence of corporate management in debtor-in- 
possession arrangements under most Chapter 11 
plans guarantees that the role of business judg- 
ment will be significant. Thus, in the end, the 
normal result of a corporate reorganization tradi- 
tionally has not been completely at odds with the 
overall lessons of human experience. 
11.  Priorities Among Creditors 
Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code prescribes a 
schedule of the priorities of distribution for 
claims of classes of creditors in a bankruptcy pro- 
ceeding. A simplified listing of the priorities 
under Section 507 is as  follows: 
Administrative expenses of the 
bankrupt's estate. 
Postpetition unsecured claims 
arising prior to the appointment of a bankruptcy 
trustee. 
Up to $2,000 per claimant for 
unsecured claims for accrued but unpaid wages, 
salaries, commissions, vacation, and sick leave 
Pay. 
After deducting the $2,000 per 
employee above, unsecured claims for up to 
$2,000 per claimant for contributions to 
employee benefits. 
Unsecured claims of farmers 
against grain elevators or of fishermen against fish 
processing plants. 
Up to $900 per unsecured claim- 
ant for security deposits and down payments for 
services not rendered or goods not provided. 
. Unsecured claims of govern- 
mental units for taxes, customs duties, and penal- 
ties accrued but unpaid. 
Claims for employees' wages and 
benefits have third and fourth priority in the 
schedule. General, unsecured, unsubordinated 
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claims, including the balance of claims for wages 
and benefits, are given no priority and, thus, 
effectively have eighth priority -  behind all 
other classes of  prior claims. 
Secured claims are not subject to 
the schedule of  priorities, but bankruptcy trustees 
may restrain secured creditors from realizing upon 
their liens in return for providing "adequate pro- 
tection" to the secured creditors while their claims 
are stayed. Unfortunately, one man's "adequate 
protection" may be another man's outrageous in- 
fringement of rights. In practice, secured creditors 
often are forced to renew their extensions of cred- 
it to bankrupt enterprises in order to allow those 
enterprises to continue operating for the benefit 
of all creditors, both secured and unsecured. 
Holders of  investment securities 
have no priority of claim and generally are paid, if 
at all, only after all prior classes of creditors are 
paid in full. A normal ranking of security holders 
is as follows: 
. Subordinated debt holders, 
including bond and note holders. 
. Preferred shareholders. 
. Common equity shareholders. 
Holders of investment securities 
are referred to the terms of the relevant legal 
documents to determine the relative priority of 
different types of investment securities within the 
classes of  investment security holders. 
111.  Evolution of the Bankruptcy Code 
The power to establish uniform laws on bank- 
ruptcies was given to Congress under Article I, 
section 8, clause 4, of  the United States Constitu- 
tion. Bankruptcy was bound up with controver- 
sies regarding debtors' prison under the common 
law and, for the first century of its existence, the 
United States had no permanent bankruptcy law.' 
Congress managed to keep bankruptcy laws on 
the books only briefly, during the years 1800- 
1803, 1841-1843, and 1867-1878. Disputes regard- 
ing the availability and liberality of discharges 
from debts in bankruptcy proceedings created the 
political pressures that caused the repeal of those 
early bankruptcy acts. Generally, Jeffersonians, 
Jacksonians, and Southern and Western Demo- 
crats favored liberal bankruptcy laws as a means 
of discharging prior debts and granting debtors 
fresh starts in life. Naturally, Tories, High Federal- 
ists, Whigs, and Republicans (that is, the creditor 
class) opposed the liberal discharges available to 
nonmerchant debtors under bankruptcy laws2 In 
A good overview of the comparative histories of  the evolution of  1  bankruptcy acts in the United States and the United Kingdom is 
Vem Countryman. A History of American Bankruptcy Law,  81 Commer- 
the aftermath of the depression following the 
Panic of 1893, the first permanent bankruptcy law 
was passed in 1898. That legislation provided 
principally for straight liquidations. Then, in fits 
and starts between 1932 and 1938, in the throes 
of  resolving the problems of a time when "so 
many were debtors, and so few were solvent," 
the forerunners of the reorganization provisions 
of the present Bankruptcy Code were enacted in 
1938. Provisions for corporate reorganizations 
(Chapter 10) and corporate arrangements (Chap- 
ter 11) appeared for the first time as part of the 
Chandler Amendments of 1938. Still, bankruptcy 
was a defensive measure for corporate debtors, 
and the requirement of corporate good faith in 
filing bankruptcy petitions, not difficult to estab- 
lish during the Great Depression, routinely was 
enforced by the courts. 
The present Bankruptcy Code was 
enacted in 1978. Chapters 10 and 11 of the 1938 
bankruptcy act were combined in the new Chap- 
ter 1  1. Under the new Chapter 11, the stay of 
creditors' claims became automatic upon the fil- 
ing of the petition. The automatic stay was seen 
as a procedural improvement from the debtors' 
perspective because, previously, the stay had to 
be requested separately, and creditors could re- 
sist the application for a stay, even after the Chap- 
ter 11 petition was filed. Also, the requirement of 
actual insolvency at the time of filing under the 
1938 act was eliminated in the new Chapter 11. 
The Bankruptcy Code was 
amended in 1984, following a June 1982 United 
States Supreme Court decision striking down cru- 
cial parts of  the 1978 Code.3 The 1984 amend- 
ments primarily were procedural, covering the 
jurisdiction and tenure of bankruptcy judges. 
However, the 1984 amendments also restricted 
the extent of discharges in consumer bankrupt- 
cies, established standardsfor judging the reaso- 
nableness of employers' rejections of collective 
bargaining agreements, reordered the priority of 
distributions of stored grain to farmers, and 
exempted certain repurchase agreements cover- 
ing financial instruments from the automatic stay 
provisions of the Code. 
See Countryman (id.) at 229-230. Of  course Jeffersonians object-  2  ed when the first bankruptcy act (1800) made discharges availa- 
ble only to merchants. On  the other hand,  Hamiltonians found the act 
useful. Robert Morris, once the financier of the American Revolution, and 
by then "the most daring real estate plunger in the United States," 
financed speculative housing development in the District of Columbia, 
beginning in 1796.  Unfortunately, in 1797, a financial panic arose from 
the outbreak of the wars between England and revolutionary France. 
Morris was ruined and spent more than three years in the Philadelphia 
debtors' prison. His discharge in 1801 under the 1800 bankruptcy act 
probably was the most famous bankruptcy discharge in the nineteenth 
century. See John C.  Miller, The  Federalist Era:  1780-1801, 252 (1960). 
I 
cia1 Law ~o;rnal  226 (1976), from which much of  the historical informa-  13 
Northem Pipeline Construction Co.  v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,  458 
tion in this commentary is taken.  U.S. 50 (1982). 
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Throughout the evolution of the 
present Bankruptcy Code, the statutes enacted 
have been reasonably clear expressions of the 
Congressional view that bankruptcy should be a 
defensive, nonroutine measure and should not 
be used to advance the financial interests of cor- 
porate debtors beyond the point that would have 
been achieved by competition in a flee market 
among solvent corporations. 
IV.  Aggressive Uses of Bankruptcy 
A potentially disturbing trend of filings under the 
Bankruptcy Code began with the classic "surprise 
filing" by the Johns-Manville Corporation in 1982. 
Johns-Manville,  facing an unpredictable amount 
of claims for damage thought to be caused by 
asbestos, proposed a Chapter 11 reorganization 
under which all present and future asbestos claim- 
ants would be reimbursed from a separate fund 
created by Johns-Manville. Meanwhile, the normal 
business operations of the corporation continued, 
comparatively unimpeded by the claims of asbes- 
tos victims. The victims' fund is to receive up to 
$2.5 billion over 25 years, including the contribu- 
tion of at least 50 percent of the common voting 
equity shares of the corporation. The Johns- 
Manville case has been questioned in some of 
the bankruptcy literature as lacking the elements 
of a good-faith filing, but at this writing it appears 
that the settlement will stand? 
Other potentially disturbing bank- 
ruptcy decisions soon followed in the wake of 
the Johns-Manville case. In February 1984, the 
United States Supreme Court decided, 5-4, in 
Nationd Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bil- 
dkco, Inc., that employers undergoing Chapter 11 
reorganizations unilaterally may abrogate or mod- 
ify collective bargaining agreements that are 
seriously burdensome to the employer when, on 
balance, the equities of the case favor modifica- 
tion of burdensome terms5 
4 
See, e.g., Mark  J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84  Columbia 
Law  Review 846 (1984); Note, The Manville Corporation bank- 
ruptcy; an abuse of  the judicial process? 11 Pepperdine Law  Review 151 
(1983); Note, Manville: good faith reorganization or "insulated" bank- 
ruptcy? 12  Hofstra Law  Review  121 (1983);  Note, Manville corporation 
and the "good faith" standard for reorganization under the Bankruptcy 
Code, 14 University of  Toledo Law  Review  1467 (1983); Note, Manville 
bankruptcy: treating mass  tort claims in Chapter 11 proceedings, 96  Har- 
vard  Law  Review  1121 (1983). 
5 
A thorough account of  the Bildisco decision, 465 U.S.  513 (1984), 
and  the enactment of  the collective bargaining provisions of  the 
Bankruptcy Code Amendments of  1984 is Thomas R.  Haggard. The Con- 
tinuing Conflict Between Bankruptcy and Labor Law --The Issues kt 
Bildisco and the 1984  Bankruptcy Amendments Did Not  Resolve, 1986 
Brigham Young  University Law  Review 1.  See  also, Benjamin Weintraub 
and  Alan  N.  Resnick. Bankruptcy Law  Manual, Problems with labor 
Unions: Rejecting Collective Bargaining Agreements, paragraph 8.1 1 (9) 
(1986).  See In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72  (3d Cir. 1982). 
The Bih'kco case illustrates the way 
that bankruptcy courts usually resolve fundarnen- 
tal conflicts between provisions of  the Bankruptcy 
Code and other provisions of federal law: Bank- 
rupcty provisions prevail. It is only natural for 
bankruptcy courts to consider the creation of via- 
bly reorganized entities as their paramount duty 
in Chapter 11 cases. The remedy for those dis- 
tressed by such tendencies on the part of  the 
bankruptcy courts is to petition Congress for 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would 
specifically address such conflicts. However, as is 
noted below, the bankruptcy courts have modified 
somewhat their tendency to elevate bankruptcy 
procedures above other considerations of federal 
or state law only in environmental pollution cases. 
Iabor leaders lobbied Congress to 
overturn the effect of the Bih'zkco decision, and 
Congress did so in the July 1984 amendments to 
the Bankruptcy Code (1  1 U.S.C. section 1  1  13, 
"Rejection of collective bargaining agreements"). 
Although they still allow employers to reject col- 
lective bargaining agreements, these amendments 
establish standards for judging the reasonable- 
ness of the rejection in light of good-faith efforts 
to negotiate modification of  the agreements. In 
the first court test of the 1984 amendments, In re 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (W.D. Pa.  1985), 
the district court sustained an employer's rejec- 
tion of wage provisions of a union contract under 
section 11  13, even though it was arguable that 
the employer had not bargained in good hith on 
the wage concessions. The union was holding 
out for further bank lenders' concessions before 
agreeing to the wage concessions. Upon appeal 
(May  1986),  the Third Circuit Court of Appeals re- 
manded the case to the district court, finding that 
the standards for rejection established by section 
11  13 of the Bankruptcy Code had not been met.6 
In the Dalkon Shield (intrauterine 
device) litigation, a Chapter 11 filing by the AH. 
Robins Company (March 1986) was intended to 
forestall future product liability claims against the 
company. At the date of filing, Robins had settled 
9,300 claims for $517 million, with 5,000 more 
claims still pending. As in the Johns-Manville case, 
the Robins filing was intended to cut off future 
product liability claims and to enable the rest of 
the company to continue operating without the 
burden of those claims. However, enough allega- 
tions of high-level corporate malfeasance emerged 
in the Robins case that the court appointed a spe- 
cial monitor to review the ongoing operations of 
senior management. Management remains in 
control of the company at this writing? 
I6 
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp, v. United Steelworkers of 
America, 791  F.2d  1074 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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In other aggresive filing develop- 
ments under the Bankruptcy Code, a new line of 
cases is evolving that might limit corporations' 
capacity to cut off liability for toxic waste pollu- 
tion of the environment by filing Chapter 11 peti- 
tions. In January 1986, the United States Supreme 
Court decided, 5-4, that bankruptcy trustees may 
not abandon corporate property under 11 U.S.C. 
section 554 (a) that is burdensome to the bank- 
ruptcy estate if the abandonment causes envir- 
onmental damage that contravenes state laws or 
health and safety regulations. The case decided in 
January 1986 was Midhntic Bank v. New Jersey 
Department of  Environmental Protection, which 
was an appeal of two 1984 Third Circuit cases 
involving Quanta Resources Corporation.8 It is 
noteworthy that, in the Midlantic case, Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion which 
stated, in relevant part: 
The Bankruptcy Court may 
not, in the exercise of  its equitable powers, 
enforce its views of sound public policy at 
the expense of the interests the Code is 
designed to protect. In these cases, it is 
undisputed that the properties in question 
were burdensome and of  inconsequential 
value to the estate. Forcing the trustee to 
expend estate assets to clean up the sites 
would plainly be contrary to the purposes 
of  the Code. 
The Midlantic case involved a 
liquidation, but comparable concerns would arise 
in Chapter 11 cases if abandonment of contami- 
nated property seemed essential to achieving a 
financially  successful corporate reorganization. In 
the future, it is not inconceivable that corpora- 
tions would attempt to cut off toxic waste liability 
by filing Chapter 11 petitions with the intent to 
abandon contaminated property. At present, the 
weight of court decisions appears to be against 
such aggressive use of Chapter 11 petitions.9 
The original bankruptcy court order 
in the Bildisco case was issued in 1981. Since 
then, Bikikco has had two progeny worthy of 
note: Wikon Fo&  and Continental Air Lines. In 
.......................................... 
See  A.H. Robins Co.  v.  Piccinin, 788  F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986). The  7 Fourth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction staying all claims 
arising from Dalkon Shield litigation against personally named co- 
defendants (typically, officers and directors of  Robins) once the Robins 
Chapter 11 petition was filed. This decision is viewed as an affirmation 
of the broad injunctive powers of a bankruptcy court to stay all claims 
involving a debtor reorganizing under Chapter 11. 
Midlantic, 474 U.S. -  , 88  L.Ed.2d 859 (1986). The  8  Supreme Court made a similar finding in the case of  Mio v.  KO- 
vacs, 469 U.S. ,  83  L.Ed.2d 6 49  (1985). In Kovacs, the 
Supreme Court held that a discharge in bankruptcy was allowed for a 
debtor whose property was seized by a state receivership which began 
to clean up a toxic waste site and then ordered the debtor to pay for the 
clean-up. The Supreme Court left for another ruling (Midlantic) the reso- 
lution of  the issue of  allowing bankruptcy trustees to abandon contami- 
nated property. 
April 1983, Wilson, then the fifth-largest meat 
packer in the United States, filed a Chapter 11 pe- 
tition in Oklahoma. Wilson then unilaterally re- 
jected collective bargaining agreements covering 
two-thirds of its employees and reduced wages 
by 40 to 50 percent. Wilson's petition showed an 
estimated positive net worth of more than $67 
million. After reducing wages, Wilson was re- 
' 
ported to have obtained a new line of credit for 
$80 million from a New York City bank.10 
In September 1983, Continental, 
then the eighth-largest airline in the United States, 
filed a Chapter 11 petition in Texas. Continental 
had been bargaining with its employees for wage 
concessions as part of a corporate strategy for be- 
coming an efficient, low-cost carrier in a deregu- 
lated environment.  After the filing, Continental 
unilaterally rejected contracts with several unions, 
including the pilots' union. All  employees tempo- 
rarily were laid off. A few days later, one-third of 
the employees were recalled, but new wages were 
reduced from former levels by more than half in 
some instances. Although Continental had a 
heavy debt burden at the time of filing, net worth 
still was positive. The reorganized Continental, 
together with low-cost affiliates such as New York 
Air, is a strong competitor over major airline 
routes in the United States and on certain interna- 
tional routes; furthermore, it is usually mentioned 
as a potential acquirer of other, troubled airlines. 
During the spring and summer of 1986, Conti- 
nental's parent company, Texas Air, was involved 
in negotiations to acquire Eastern Airlines and 
People Express. At this writing, it appears that 
those acquisitions will be consummated. 
Taking the Chapter 11 baton from 
Continental is Frontier Airlines, a unionized carrier 
serving the western United States that was 
acquired in 1985 by the ultimate low-cost air car- 
rier, People Express. Facing a heavy debt burden 
and expanded price competition over most of  its 
domestic routes, People Express offered Frontier 
for sale in the late spring of 1986. One potential 
acquirer, United Airlines, was close to completing 
the purchase of Frontier but, as of this writing, 
has not done so. 
One of the obstacles to United's ac- 
quisition of Frontier was its inability to negotiate 
9 
In United States v.  MaMand  Bank &  Trust Co., -  F.Supp. 
-  (D.  Md.,) slip op.  Apr. 9,  1986), the environmental protec- 
tion laws were extended to enable the Environmental Protection Agency 
to maintain lawsuits against innocent parties foreclosing on contami- 
nated property and to require them to pay for the costs of  cleaning up 
the property. It is believed that such precedents will complicate Chapter 
11 proceedings in the future by raising the spectre of unscheduled liabili- 
ties in amounts that, if not stayed or  discharged, would disrupt the 
orderly reorganization of  companies operating under Chapter 11 in cases 
involving infringement of environmental protection laws. 
1  10 
Graeme Browning, Using Bankruptcy to Reject Labor Con- 
tracts, 70 American Bar  Association Joumal 60 (Feb.  1984) 
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a mutually satisfactoly transitional salw  scale for 
Frontier's pilots, who generally earned less than 
United's pilots. Other potential acquirers of Fron- 
tier apparently were willing to purchase it only if 
the collective bargaining agreements with the 
principal Frontier unions were rejected. People 
Express apparently threatened to file a Chapter 11 
petition for Frontier in order to induce Frontier's 
unions to be more forthcoming. Thus, the Fron- 
tier case illustrates another variation of the 
aggressive use of Chapter 11 filings: The threat to 
file becomes a bargaining chip in labor negotia- 
tions. United's negotiations regarding Frontier 
were interrupted by the filing of a Chapter 11 
petition for Frontier on August 28, 1986.11 
One debtor that has shown real 
initiative following a bankruptcy reorganization is 
Wickes corporation, a California-based building 
supply company that filed its Chapter 11 petition 
in April 1982, shortly before the upturn from the 
1981-82 recession began. Reorganized under 
strong management, Wickes reduced operating 
expenses, closed unprofitable stores, and renego- 
tiated or rejected a number of building leases for 
its stores. Wickes emerged from Chapter 11 in 
early 1985. A year later, in April 1986, Wickes 
attempted to acquire the National Gypsum Cor- 
poration for approximately $1.2 billion. After that 
takeover attempt failed, during August 1986, 
Wickes mounted a new hostile tender offer for 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Toledo, 
Ohio. Wickes apparently intended to finance the 
tender offer with an issue of so-called "junk 
bonds" and with the planned post-acquisition 
sale of Owens-Corning operations not closely 
related to the core operations of Wickes. The 
tender offer was valued at $2.1 billion. On August 
29, 1986, Wickes terminated the offer, but analysts 
estimated that Wickes had a net gain of at least 
$30 million from the increased value of Owens- 
Coming shares acquired during the takeover 
attempt. It is significant that a company that not 
long ago filed a Chapter 11 petition, apparently in 
good faith, has been able to mount hostile tender 
offers for multi-billion-dollar corporations within 
little more than a year after ceasing to operate 
under the supervision of a bankruptcy court. 
V.  Implications for the Bankruptcy System 
The sequence of all the cases cited above is a 
signal that something might be wrong in the 
bankruptcy system. For bankruptcy specialists, 
and for economists generally, those cases are like, 
Press reports in early September 1986 indicated that hco,  1  1  a major producer of steel. also allegedly was using the threat 
of a Chapter 11 filing to induce its employees' union to make wage con- 
cessions. In fact, the union agreed to the concessions and no  Chapter 11 
petition was filed. 
in the words of Thomas Jefferson, a "fire-bell in 
the night ..... [W]  e have the wolf by the ears, and 
we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. 
Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the 
other."'2 Jefferson was writing about the perni- 
cious effects of slavery on the preservation of  the 
Union and about the controversies raised by the 
Missouri Compromise. The message of  those 
words, however, for defenders of the notions of a 
free market and of market discipline in American 
enterprise, is that actions currently taken under 
Chapter 11, while perfectly legal under the pres- 
ent Bankruptcy Code, may be moving inexorably 
in the direction of a race to the courthouse to 
enable solvent, albeit troubled, corporations to 
gain positive advantages over competitors. Such a 
race for competitive advantage through the legal 
process eventually undermines the free-market 
system, as well as the other laws overridden by 
the Bankrutpcy Code, such as environmental pro- 
tection or labor laws. 
Yet, competitors in any line of  bus- 
iness "have the wolf by the ears" in that they 
cannot safely renounce the use of Chapter 11 fil- 
ings as a means of reducing operating costs 
unless allsignificant competitors in that line of 
business refrain from filing as long as they are 
solvent. Thus, justice (fair play) demands that all 
solvent competitors refrain from filing, but self- 
preservation demands that all competitors retain 
the capacity to file as long as any significant com- 
petitor has that capacity. 
If  efficiency in the market is 
achieved most easily by becoming a low-cost 
producer under the protective umbrella of a 
Chapter 11 filing, why should any corporation 
exert itself to achieve efficiency by bargaining 
and by open competition in a free market?  Before 
1978, a showing of insolvency was a prerequisite 
of a Chapter 11 filing, but that requirement was 
dropped in the present Bankruptcy Code.13 The 
question now presented is whether the benefits 
that were supposed to flow from the removal of 
the requirement of insolvency have been out- 
weighed by the deficiencies -  if  they are, in [act, 
deficiencies -  of  the present statute. After all, in 
the words of one bankruptcy expert, 
Chapter 11 is supposed to be 
rehabilitative,  ... a device "which can be 
used to cure a company that's ill or hemor- 
rhaging." It is better to apply the cure while 
a company "has strength and vitality left - 
before letting it die."'* 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes, April 22, 1820,  1  2  in The Portable Thomas Jefferson 567,  Merrill D  Peterson 
ed. (1975, reprinted 1980). 
I  1  3  Browning. supra note 10 
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Thus, it is important to remember 
that not all observers believe that the present 
uses of Chapter 11 are all bad. The issue of good 
faith in filing could be addressed satisfactorily by 
scrutinizing Chapter 11 filings in light of the 
question: "Is this company financially troubled 
enough to justify the filing?%y that standard, 
some of the recent Chapter 11 filings (for exam- 
ple, Wickes, LW,  and Frontier) might not be par- 
ticularly troublesome. 
VI. summary 
The law of bankruptcy has been intended since 
1898 to grant debtors relief kom claims of  unse- 
cured trade creditors, bank lenders, and the like, 
but not to affect substantially the claims of em- 
ployees for accrued, but unpaid, wages and bene- 
fits, or the claims of governmental units for taxes. 
Such claims were, and still are, given priority in 
the distribution of assets of bankruptcy estates. 
Since 1982, a new trend has emerged in which 
aggressive bankruptcy filings are used to achieve 
the greater financial objectives of the corporations 
filing Chapter 11 petitions. The 1984 arnend- 
ments to the Bankruptcy Code were intended to 
rein in perceived abuses of the corporate capacity 
to disavow employment contracts. Some may 
argue that the July 17,1986 filing by LTV Corpora- 
tion was yet another corporate effort in the direc- 
tion that was opposed by the 1984 amendments. 
It is possible to contend that the filing was 
designed to enable LTV to modify its collective 
bargaining agreements substantially or to reject 
future liability for employee benefits, including 
pension or insurance liabilities. On the other 
hand, LTV clearly was having financial troubles, 
and issues regarding the good faith of  its failing 
still have to be resolved by the bankruptcy court. 
The cases described above fall into 
three broad categories: 
1.  Contingent products liability or environ- 
mental protection 
Johns-Manville  (1982) 
AH. Robins (1986) 
Miantic  (1986) (Chapter 7) 
2.  Ekecutov collective bargaining agreements 
BiIdzkco (1981.1984). 
Wikon Foods (  1983) 
Continental Air Lines (1983) 
Frontier Airlines (  1986) 
3. Restructuring and downsizing corporate 
liabilities 
Wickes (  1982 ) 
LW  (1986). 
The Supreme Cow  thus far seems to be sustain- 
ing the primacy of bankruptcy considerations in 
the second and third categories of cases, while 
continuing to sustain the primacy of environmen- 
tal protection laws in cases that do not involve 
mass tort litigation. 
In any case, it is clear that compan- 
ies with the benefit of the protection afforded by 
Chapter 11 filings have advantages in corporate 
financial structure that are not available to sim- 
ilarly situated, but presumably solvent, competi- 
tors who do not file. Thus, it is reasonable to 
predict that, in a disinflationary environment, an 
increased number of aggressive Chapter 1  1 filings 
will occur in any industry in which a significant 
competitor alters its costs of production by filing 
a Chapter 11 petition. In the absence of a more 
orderly, formal procedure for downsizing corpo- 
rate assets and liabilities in the United States, such 
a use of Chapter 11 is neither illogical nor com- 
pletely unforeseeable. The remedy for aggressive 
uses of Chapter 11, if  a remedy becomes desira- 
ble as a matter of  public policy, is to be found by 
following the traditional path of Congressional 
enactment of corrective amendments of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
At the same time, the purpose of 
the 1978 revisions of Chapter 11 should be kept 
in mind: The rehabilitation of ailing companies 
should be effected before they become termi- 
nally ill. If  nothing concentrates the mind like the 
prospect of being hanged, then the opportunity 
for a debtor to file a Chapter 11 petition before its 
case is terminal ought to serve a constructive 
purpose: It should encourage lenders, 
employees, and the company's other constituent 
groups to cooperate in attempting to improve the 
chances for restoring the company's competitive 
viability in order to avoid the filing. The same 
spirit of cooperation should prevail if  a filing 
occurs despite everyone's best efforts. 
1  14 
Roy Carlin, Esq.,  bankruptcy counsel for Wilson Foods, 
quoted in Browning, supra  note 10. 
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